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History eﬀect in free choice of saccade direction
Abstract
When we voluntarily act, we make a decision to do so prior to the actual execution.
However, due to the strong tie between decision and action, it has been diﬃcult to
dissociate these two processes in an animal’s free behavior. In the present study, we
tried to characterize the diﬀerences in these processes based on their unique history
eﬀect. Using simple eye-movement tasks in which the direction of a saccade was either
instructed by a computer or freely chosen by the subject, we found that the preceding
decision and action had diﬀerent eﬀects on the animal’s subsequent behavior. While
choosing a direction (previous decision) produced a positive history eﬀect that prompted
the choice of the same saccade direction, making a saccadic response to a direction
(previous action) produced a negative history eﬀect that discouraged the monkey from
choosing the same direction. This result suggests that the history eﬀect in sequential
behavior reported in previous studies was a mixture of these two diﬀerent components.
Future studies on decision-making need to consider the importance of the distinction
between decision and action in animal behavior.
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Introduction
An animal’s behavior is composed of sequences of actions. To behave properly in a
complex environment, an animal has to monitor the results of its own actions and be
able to change the next behavior ﬂexibly based on previous experiences. If the previous
actions were valid and produced a positive result, the animal should maintain the same
behavioral strategy and repeat the same action. However, when previous actions were
unfruitful or had a negative result, the animal must change its behavior to prevent future
losses.
In recent studies, how an animal’s behavior is inﬂuenced by the past trial history has
been extensively investigated using probability learning tasks. By assessing the animal’s
behavior during the exploration of multiple options with diﬀerent reward probabilities,
the experimenter can examine the animal’s ability to ﬂexibly change its behavior based
on past experience. For instance, previous studies have reported a history eﬀect of past
trials in monkeys (Lau and Glimcher 2005) and rodents (Kim et al. 2009; Sul et al. 2010,
2011). In these studies, the animals tended to continue to choose previously rewarded
options, along with a general tendency for alternation from their own previous response.
This competition between repeating and changing from the previous response is often
explained in the context of “exploration and exploitation”, which is advantageous when
foraging in a natural environment (Kumar and Varaiya 1986; Bertsekas 1987; Stephens
and Krebs 1987). However, in the framework of probabilistic learning, animals are
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highly trained to always beware of a possible changeover of the reward contingency
and to search for a new response strategy (Cohen et al. 2007). Therefore, the animal’s
behavior and resultant positive and negative history eﬀect observed in these studies
might be caused by the speciﬁc task structure in a probabilistic learning paradigm with
contingency reversal.
Moreover, previous studies have mainly focused on how an animal’s choice history
and reinforcement history could predict its response in the current trial (Kim et al.
2009; Sul et al. 2011). In these studies, “the decision to make a particular action”
and “the physical execution of the chosen action” were not distinguished because they
necessarily coincided in their paradigm. However, when animals make a voluntary
action, there must have been a decision to do so before the action is executed. Although
this close tie between decision and action is inevitable and the diﬀerence in their
behavioral signiﬁcance usually receives little attention, these two processes are not
equal. While action execution requires precise planning and the actual transmission
of motor commands to lower centers, decision-making involves the representation and
evaluation of multiple options for motor output. The diﬀerence in the biological basis
of these two processes may result in diﬀerent eﬀects on future cognitive functioning.
Therefore, a preceding decision and action can have diﬀerent eﬀects on subsequent
behavior, and they can be dissociated under an appropriate experimental setup.
In the present study, we investigated how an animal’s behavior is modiﬁed by
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the preceding trial history using a memory-guided saccade paradigm with macaque
monkeys (Funahashi et al. 1989; Goldman-Rakic 1995). To dissociate the history eﬀect
of preceding action and decision, we used two types of tasks in which the monkey made
a memory-guided saccade toward an instructed or personally chosen spatial location
(Watanabe and Funahashi 2004; Watanabe et al. 2006). While the monkeys were
required to choose the saccade direction by themselves in the latter task, there was
no such requirement in the former task. Thus, while the action that the monkeys ﬁnally
needed to make (a saccadic eye-movement toward one direction) was identical in the
two tasks, only in the latter task did they have to decide where to make the saccade. By
contrasting the behavior in these two tasks that did and did not require the animal’s own
decision-making with regard to the saccade direction, we could dissociate the inﬂuence
of the preceding action and decision on the following behavior. In addition, the monkeys
were always rewarded with the same amount of juice regardless of which task they
performed or where they chose to make a saccade. Therefore, in the present study,
there was no task-structural bias for switching the response among possible actions,
and the animal’s natural tendency to repeat and change from the previous behavior
could be examined. As a result, the preceding decision history had a positive eﬀect
which promoted saccades toward the same direction in subsequent trials. On the other
hand, the preceding action history had an opposite eﬀect, preventing the animals from
repeating saccades toward the same direction. This ﬁnding oﬀers new insight into
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studies of animal behavior and emphasizes the importance of distinguishing “the action
itself” from “the decision to perform the action” in cognitive science.
Materials and Methods
Animals
We used two Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata; monkeys O and E). The monkeys
were housed in individual stainless steel home cages. Water intake was restricted in
the home cage but provided as a reward in the laboratory. Additional vegetables and
fruits were provided to fulﬁll the required water intake if necessary. All experimental
procedures were conducted in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Primate
Research Institute of Kyoto University and were approved by the Animal Research
Committee at the Graduate School of Human and Environmental Studies, Kyoto
University.
Apparatus
During experimental sessions, the monkey sat in a primate chair in a dark
sound-attenuated room with its head movements restricted by a head-holding apparatus.
We used TEMPO software (Reﬂective Computing, Olympia, WA, USA) for task control
and data acquisition. Visual stimuli were presented on a 20-inch CRT monitor (Dell
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UltraScan D2026T-HS, Dell, Round Rock, TX, USA) that was placed 40 cm from the
subject’s face. A scleral search coil system (Enzanshi Kogyo, Tokyo, Japan) was used
to monitor the monkeys’ eye movements (Robinson 1963; Judge et al. 1980).
Tasks
We used two types of memory-guided saccade tasks (Fig. 1a): the Instructed Choice
Task (ICT) and Free Choice Task (FCT). In both tasks, a trial started with the
presentation of a ﬁxation point (white cross, 0.5° in visual angle) at the center of the
monitor. After the monkey maintained ﬁxation on the ﬁxation point for 1.0 sec (ﬁxation
period), eight peripheral targets (white cross, 0.75° in visual angle) were presented at
an eccentricity of 13° in visual angle (0°–315°, separated by 45°). The monkey had to
neglect these targets and keep watching the ﬁxation point for another 1.0 sec (pre-cue
period). Next, one or two visual cues (ﬁlled white circle, 2.5° in visual angle) were
brieﬂy blinked over the peripheral targets for 0.5 sec (cue period). In the ICT, one cue
was presented at one of the eight target locations. In the FCT, two identical cues were
simultaneously presented at two peripheral locations. After the cues disappeared, the
monkey had to maintain ﬁxation for the following 1.5–3.0 sec (delay period). At the end
of the delay period, the ﬁxation point was turned oﬀ, and the monkey was required to
make a memory-guided saccade toward the cued location. A saccade to either of the two
locations was regarded as correct in FCT trials. Every correct response was rewarded
7
by a drop of juice, and there was no diﬀerence in the amount of reward regardless of the
monkey’s choice in the FCT or the type of the task.
ICT and FCT trials were not arranged in a blockwise fashion but were intermingled
in a random order from trial to trial. The location of the cue in ICT trials was randomly
determined as one of eight peripheral target locations. In FCT trials, possible cue
locations were limited to four vertical and horizontal locations (0°, 90°, 180° and 270°)
to reduce the number of combinations of cue locations. In an FCT trial, cues were
randomly presented at two of these four possible locations. Accordingly, trials consisted
of eight cue conditions in the ICT and six pair conditions in the FCT. The proportion of
FCT trials was approximately three times greater than that of the ICT to promote data
collection regarding choice behavior.
Surgery and Training Procedure
We implanted a stainless steel head-holding device and a scleral search coil in the
monkeys. A scleral search coil was implanted onto the right eye globe by dissecting
the conjunctiva (Judge et al. 1980). The monkeys were ﬁrst anesthetized by an
intramuscular injection of ketamine hydrochloride (10 mg/kg) and then an intravenous
injection of pentobarbital sodium (10–15 mg/kg). Heart rate and respiration were
monitored during the surgery. Stainless steel screws were put into the skull to ensure
ﬁrm adhesion of the head-holding device. The connector for the search coil and the
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head-holding device were ﬁxed to the skull with dental acrylic. All of the surgical
procedures were performed under aseptic conditions.
After the monkeys recovered from surgery, we started the training of the tasks. We
ﬁrst trained the monkeys with the ICT. When the monkeys learned to perform the ICT
(about 85% correct on more than ﬁve consecutive experimental sessions), we started to
intermingle FCT trials with ICT trials.
Data Analysis
All statistical analyses and data plotting were performed using the statistical software
R 3.0.2 (R Core Team 2013). We used Bonferroni’s correction method in testing
statistical signiﬁcance in multiple comparisons unless otherwise noted. The proportion
correct was separately calculated for the ICT and the FCT by dividing the number of
trials with correct target capture by the number of trials that the animal reached the
response period. In order to examine the individual diﬀerences of directional preference
between the monkeys, we applied chi-squared tests to the number of choices in the
FCT. We ﬁrst pooled the sessions within individuals and then performed chi-squared
tests to compare the number of choices in each pair condition between the subjects
(pair-based preference). We also compared the number of the choice of a given direction




To quantify how behavioral history in past trials would inﬂuence an animal’s own
choice of saccade direction in future trials, we performed a logistic regression analysis.
We investigated how the monkey’s choice in FCT trials could be explained based on
the behavioral history in the 10 preceding trials. In this analysis, the eﬀectiveness
of preceding ICT and FCT trials for predicting the monkey’s choice was separately
estimated. Additionally, we divided preceding FCT trials into two types: those in which
the monkey was presented with the same cue pair (FCTs trial) and those with diﬀerent
cue pairs (FCTd trial) compared to the current trial. Based on this categorization, the
10 preceding trials were classiﬁed into three trial types (ICT, FCTs and FCTd) with
regard to the current trial. By applying a logistic regression analysis, we measured
how the monkey was likely to repeat choosing the same direction for a saccade that was
instructed or freely chosen in preceding trials. For each monkey and for an arbitrary pair
condition with directions A and B, we ﬁrst collected the subject’s choice in FCT trials
with that pair condition and the prior behavioral sequence up to 10 trials before each of
those FCT trials from all the sessions available for that subject. Then we estimated the
history eﬀect of preceding trials on the monkey’s choice in the current trial using the
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where pA and pB are the probabilities of choosing directions A and B. The variables
i j, s j, dj correspond to the eﬀect of the previously executed behavior and are 1 if the
monkey responded to direction A, −1 if the monkey responded to direction B, and 0
if the monkey responded to neither direction A nor direction B in the j-th preceding
ICT, FCTs and FCTd trials, respectively. The variables uj correspond to the eﬀect of
the previously withdrawn behavior and are 1 if the monkey gave up direction A, −1
if the monkey gave up direction B, and otherwise 0 in the j-th preceding FCTd trials.
The coeﬃcients ι j (ICT), σ j (FCTs), δ j (FCTd chosen) and υ j (FCTd unchosen) denote
the four types of the history eﬀect explained above, and γ is a bias term. Note that
there is no direction given up in the ICT, because only one cue was presented. Also,
for the preceding FCTs trials, the eﬀect of not choosing a direction is not dissociable
from the eﬀect of choosing, because not choosing direction B is the same to the choice of
direction A. Therefore, the eﬀect of not choosing could be a subject for the investigation
only in the preceding FCTd trials. The lags for the trials ( j) were computed based on the
number of trials from the current trial counting all the types of previous trials (ICT, FCTs
and FCTd) altogether. For example, ι−3 is the eﬀect of the previous ICT trial located
exactly three trials before the current trial, and not the eﬀect of the third latest ICT trial
by selectively counting the previous ICT trials (Fig. 1b). Estimated coeﬃcients were
then averaged across six pair conditions, resulting in 40 coeﬃcients for each monkey
(excluding the bias term).
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To examine the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated history eﬀect, we used a
shuﬄing method. For each session’s data, we shuﬄed the indices for FCT trials
respectively among each of the six pair conditions. Thus, the monkey’s choice in every
FCT trial was exchanged with that of the other FCT trial with the same cue pair in that
session. By this manipulation, we uncoupled the result of the monkey’s choice from
the trial history prior to each FCT trial. The sequence of task and pair conditions as
well as the overall number of choices in each FCT pair condition were kept unchanged.
Since the potential inﬂuence of the particular order of trial conditions possible in the
data was preserved in this shuﬄed sample, we could dissociate the genuine eﬀect of
the behavioral history by comparing the results of regression for real data to those for
shuﬄed data. We performed resampling 2000 times for each subject and calculated the
conﬁdence intervals of every behavioral measure in the logistic regression analysis.
Reinforcement learning models
To directly estimate the history eﬀect of preceding decision and action, we used a
reinforcement learning model to ﬁt the monkeys’ performance (Sutton and Barto 1998).
For each session, the values of each saccade direction were maintained separately and
updated based on the monkey’s behavior. We assumed that choosing, not choosing,
and responding to a direction would independently inﬂuence the values of the chosen,
unchosen and responded directions. In contrast to the probabilistic learning literature
(Lau and Glimcher 2005; Kim et al. 2009; Sul et al. 2010, 2011), the monkeys in the
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present study could obtain the same amount of reward for every correct trial, regardless
of the task or response direction. Therefore, the value of a direction was updated by
simply adding a diﬀerent increment based on how the response was made. We used
three increment parameters for values of directions, that were responded (ΔR), chosen
(ΔC) or unchosen (ΔU) by the animal. The value for direction A in the i-th trial (QA, i)
was updated by:
QA, i+1 = α · QA, i + Δ
where Δ is ΔR for the response direction in an ICT trial, ΔR + ΔC for the response
direction in an FCT trial, ΔU for the direction presented but unchosen in an FCT trial,
and 0 for directions that were not presented in that particular trial. Coeﬃcient α is a
discount factor. For an arbitrary pair condition with directions A and B, the probability












We compared three reinforcement learning models by embedding diﬀerent
combinations of the increment parameters to examine which model best illustrates the
animal’s behavior. In the ﬁrst model, we implemented only ΔR parameter for the value
update and other two parameters (ΔC and ΔU) were set to 0 (R model). Therefore,
the value of the response direction was equally updated in the ICT and FCT. Although
there is no variable to denote the presence or absence of the reward because of the
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guaranteed reward delivery in the present study, this model corresponds to a standard
Q-learning model in which the values are updated only by the experienced outcome
(Watkins and Dayan 1992; Sutton and Barto 1998). In the second model, we used
ΔR and ΔC parameters but ΔU was set to 0 (R+C model). Therefore, the value of the
response direction in the FCT was update by ΔC in addition to ΔR. In the third model,
we used all the ΔR, ΔC and ΔU parameters (R+C+U model). Therefore, the value
of the unchosen direction presented in the FCT was diﬀerently updated. This model
corresponds to the models with value updates for unchosen alternatives used in previous
studies (Lee et al. 2005; Abe and Lee 2011; Hayden et al. 2009). For each session’s data,
we applied all the three models to the animal’s behavior and calculated the parameters
in the models using the maximum-likelihood estimation method with the optim function
in R (Nelder and Mead 1965; Nash 1980). We compared the goodness of the model by
calculating Akaike’s information criteria (AIC) to investigate whether choosing and not
choosing a direction in the animal’s own decision exhibited unique eﬀect on the values
of the spatial locations. We also compared each model’s prediction performance of
the animal behavior by a leave-one-out cross-validation. For each model, we averaged
the parameters of the model across all the sessions except for one test session, and
then applied the same model with the averaged parameters to the test session. The
prediction performance was calculated as a proportion of FCT trials in which the value





Both monkeys learned to perform well in the tasks. Monkey O performed 98 sessions.
Figure 2a shows the example of saccadic responses in the ICT and FCT. Each session
consisted of about 600 trials and the average proportion correct was 96.1% for the ICT
and 98.0% for the FCT. Monkey E performed 98 sessions. Each session consisted of
about 500 trials and the average proportion correct was 98.1% for the ICT and 97.9%
for the FCT. The paired t-test revealed a slightly higher task performance for the FCT
in monkey O (p < .001 for monkey O, p = .40 for monkey E). This might be related
to the higher chance level to capture a correct location in the FCT if the monkey makes
a saccade to one of the eight target locations by guessing. (There were two correct
locations in the FCT, rather than just one.) However, in general, the monkeys seldom
made erroneous responses in either task. In total, data for 59454 and 47301 correct trials
for each monkey were acquired and used in the further analysis.
The monkeys exhibited directional preferences, but chose both directions in each
FCT pair condition (Fig. 2b). Overall, the choice proportion was most biased in the
upper vs lower condition (0.26:0.74) for monkey O and right vs lower (0.64:0.36) for
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monkey E. To compare the preference for saccade directions between the monkeys,
we applied chi-squared tests to the proportion of choices in each pair conditions. The
proportion of choosing each of the two directions was diﬀerent between the monkeys
in all pair conditions except for one condition (chi-squared test, corrected p = .74 for
right vs lower pair condition, p < .001 for other pair conditions). The proportions of
trials in which the monkey chose right, upper, left and lower direction out of the total
number of trials in which that direction was presented in the FCT were 65.1%, 31.3%,
49.5% and 54.7% for monkey O and 53.6%, 53.8%, 52.5% and 40.0% for monkey E,
respectively. This direction-based rather than the pair-based preference was diﬀerent
between the monkeys for all the four directions (chi-squared test, corrected p < .01
for all directions). The inconsistency of directional preference between the monkeys
suggests that the preference for a particular direction was not a principal source of the
characteristic history eﬀect reported in the subsequent analysis.
History Eﬀect based on the Logistic Regression Analysis
To quantify how preceding trials inﬂuence the free choice of saccade direction in the
current trial, we performed a logistic regression analysis. In this model, the history
eﬀect of 10 preceding trials was used as regressors to explain the choice in the current
FCT trial. Regression was performed separately for each FCT pair condition. The
eﬀects of preceding ICT and FCT trials were independently estimated as diﬀerent
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predictors. The eﬀects of preceding FCT trials were further diﬀerentiated into two
conditions: i.e., the eﬀects of preceding trials with the same (FCTs) and diﬀerent
(FCTd) cue pairs compared to the current trial (see Materials and Methods). Also, the
eﬀect of choosing and not choosing a direction was separately examined for preceding
FCTd trials. Therefore, there were three conditions of preceding trials (ICT, FCTs
and FCTd) that constituted four types of history eﬀect (preceding ICT, FCTs, FCTd
chosen/unchosen), and a set of 41 regression coeﬃcients (10 preceding trials for 4
conditions, and a bias term) were estimated for each FCT pair condition.
Figure 3a,c shows the averaged coeﬃcients of logistic regression for the six FCT pair
conditions. In both monkeys, the coeﬃcients for preceding ICT drastically decreased
3–4 trials prior to the current trial. This indicates that the monkeys were less likely to
choose the direction that they had been forced to respond to immediately before that
trial. The coeﬃcients of preceding FCT with diﬀerent cue pairs (FCTd) were similar to
those in the ICT except for a slight positive shift in the chosen direction and negative
shift in the unchosen direction. This suggests that the monkeys had a general tendency
to avoid choosing the directions available in the previous trials, regardless of whether
they were chosen or not.
On the other hand, the coeﬃcients of preceding FCT with a cue pair identical to that
in the current trial (FCTs) were largely higher than those of the ICT in both monkeys.
In monkey E, the coeﬃcients for the FCTs condition were positive throughout the
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preceding trials, indicating that the monkey was likely to choose the same direction
when an identical cue pair was repeatedly presented in adjacent FCT trials. There was
a slight increase in the eﬀect in the latest and second latest preceding FCTs trials. In
monkey O, the coeﬃcients for the FCTs condition were also positive for most of the
preceding trials, but decreased to nearly zero in one trial before the current trial. This
indicates that the monkey’s tendency to choose the same direction in the FCTs condition
disappeared when the same FCT condition was repeatedly presented in two consecutive
trials. Thus, there was an individual diﬀerence in history eﬀect when the preceding trials
were divided into four conditions.
In the logistic regression analysis based on the shuﬄed data, the results were
identical between two monkeys (Fig. 3b,d). Because the choice in the current FCT
trial is uncoupled from its original history of trial sequence, the coeﬃcients remained
constant across preceding trials in each condition. In both monkeys, the regression
coeﬃcients for preceding ICT trials was virtually zero. For the FCT, the coeﬃcients
for preceding FCTs trials and choosing in preceding FCTd trials were positive. The
coeﬃcients for not choosing in preceding FCTd trials was negative. These history
eﬀects in FCT trials can be attributed to the animal’s overall directional preference in
each session, which lead to correlated choices by chance in FCT trials within the same
session.
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Dissociation of Decision and Action History
The logistic regression model described above was based solely on the categorization
of the trial type, and does not consider the cognitive processes in each condition.
Therefore, we further examined the eﬀect of preceding decision and action history based
on the coeﬃcients obtained from the logistic regression. In ICT trials, the monkeys were
only required to make a forced response toward the instructed direction and there was no
room for a choice. Therefore, the regression coeﬃcients obtained from preceding ICT
trials could be directly regarded as the eﬀect of preceding actions. On the other hand,
in FCT trials, the monkeys needed to both choose the saccade direction by themselves
and make a response toward it. In this regard, preceding FCT trials have both decision
and action aspects, which could independently inﬂuence the current trial. Therefore,
the estimated coeﬃcients for preceding FCT trials would be a mixture of decision and
action history eﬀects.
To separate the eﬀect of decision history from that of action history and solely
examine the former, we subtracted the regression coeﬃcients for the ICT from those
for the FCT. The history eﬀect of decision in the j-th preceding trial was calculated as
σ j − ι j for FCTs trials and δ j − ι j for FCTd trials. These diﬀerences of the regression
coeﬃcients between FCT and ICT trials could represent how the monkey’s tendency to
make a particular choice overcame the eﬀect of the past saccadic response toward that
direction.
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Figure 4 shows the result of the dissociation of decision history from action history.
The eﬀect of decision history in preceding FCTs trials was positive for both monkeys
throughout the 10 trials of the analytic period and exceeded the conﬁdence intervals
calculated from the shuﬄed data (Fig. 4b) during the 3–4 trials before the current
trial. On the other hand, the eﬀect of decision history in preceding FCTd trials were
weak for both monkeys and did not exceed the conﬁdence intervals from the shuﬄed
samples. These results indicate that the monkeys tended to repeat the same decision in
adjacent trials, but this eﬀect of decision history was speciﬁc to the pair conditions. The
individual diﬀerence of the regression coeﬃcients for preceding FCTs trials between
the monkeys (Fig. 3) could be the result of a strong negative action history eﬀect in
monkey O, which could have canceled the positive eﬀect of decision history and led
to a deterioration of choice predictability in the FCTs condition in one trial before the
current trial.
History Eﬀect based on the Reinforcement Learning Models
The results of the logistic regression analysis suggested that the preceding decision and
action have diﬀerent eﬀects on the choice in subsequent trials. Therefore, we tried to
directly characterize these eﬀects by applying reinforcement learning models in which
the eﬀects of decision and action on the value for each saccade direction were separately
implemented (see Materials and Methods). In the models, each direction retained its
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own value, and the choice in FCT trials was determined based on a comparison of the
values of the two presented directions. We used three models. In all the models, the
value of the responded direction was updated by ΔR in both ICT and FCT trials. In two
of the models, we tested the eﬀect of the animal’s own decision of saccade direction
by further updating the value of the responded direction by ΔC in FCT trials. In one of
these models, we also tested the eﬀect of not choosing a direction by updating the value
of the unchosen direction by ΔU in FCT trials.
We ﬁt the models to the animal’s behavior separately for each session. Table 1
shows the averaged parameters and the goodness of each model based on the AIC and
the prediction performance. The models with ΔC parameter (R+C model and R+C+U
model) performed better than the model with ΔR parameter alone (R model) in most of
the sessions (96 of 98 sessions for monkey O, 95 of 98 sessions for monkey E). Between
the former models, the model with ΔU parameter was more frequently selected, but the
prediction performance was similar between the two models. In both R+C and R+C+U
models, ΔR was signiﬁcantly smaller than zero, indicating that making a saccadic
response to a direction decreased its value (Wilcoxon signed rank test, corrected p < .01
and p < .001 for R+C and R+C+Umodels in monkey O, p < .01 and p < .05 in monkey
E). On the other hand, ΔC was signiﬁcantly larger than zero, indicating that choosing a
direction increased its value (Wilcoxon signed rank test, corrected p < .001 and p < .05
for R+C and R+C+U models in monkey O, p < .001 for both models in monkey E).
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In R+C+U model, ΔU was signiﬁcantly smaller than zero (Wilcoxon signed rank test,
corrected p < .001 in both monkeys). These results indicate that “deciding to make an
action” and “making an action itself” have opposite eﬀects on the value of the executed
behavior, which leads to the diﬀerential eﬀects of decision and action history observed
in the logistic regression analysis.
Discussion
In the present study, we found that preceding decision and action had diﬀerent eﬀects on
the subsequent behavior of the animal. These two behavioral components are generally
considered to be indissociable in studies on decision-making, since the result of a
decision always needs to be carried out as a physical action to be observed by the
experimenter. In other words, the strong tie between decision and action makes it
diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate their eﬀects on animal behavior. However, in the present study,
we could successfully separate these two components by comparing the history eﬀects
in the ICT and the FCT. Choosing a direction produces a positive history eﬀect that
promotes the choice of the same saccade direction when the identical choice situation
is presented repeatedly. On the other hand, making a saccadic response to a direction
produces a negative history eﬀect and discourages the monkey from choosing the same
direction. Both of these eﬀects were strongly manifested during 3–4 trials. Consistent
results were obtained from the analysis using the reinforcement learning model.
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Competing Tendencies for Repetitive Behavior and Repetition
Avoidance
It is known that human subjects generally tend to avoid repeating the same behavior
(Brugger et al. 1996). For example, subjects make more changes in their response
than mathematically expected when asked to generate a random sequence of letters or
numbers (Rabinowitz et al. 1989; Brugger 1997; Falk and Konold 1997). On the other
hand, it is also known that humans sometimes show a robust tendency to repeat the
same behavior (Sandson and Albert 1984). Persistence in repetitive behavior becomes
particularly apparent in patients with brain damage and disorders, such as perseveration
in motor control (Annoni et al. 1998; Na et al. 1999), verbal expression (Cohen and
Dehaene 1998) and non-verbal expression (Goldberg and Tucker 1979; Cosentino et al.
2004). Perseveration is evident even in higher-order cognitive functions, as seen in the
Wisconsin card sorting test (Milner 1963; Nelson 1976). Thus, humans seem to possess
opposing behavioral tendencies that support and discourage repetitions.
However, in animal studies on decision-making, most previous experiments have
been performed with tasks that provide behavioral options with diﬀerent reinforcement
probabilities. For example, in studies using a concurrent reward schedule, animals are
provided with two response options (e.g. left or right key) and allowed to choose one
of them (Herrnstein and Loveland 1974; Shapiro and Allison 1978). These two options
diﬀer with respect to their reward ratio or interval and the animals need to ﬁnd which
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one is more advantageous by trial and error. In addition, after the animals learn the
highly rewarding option, the reward contingency with two options changes without any
announcement. Under such a task contingency, animals should continue to choose the
same option once they identify which is advantageous. Nevertheless, they also have to
keep monitoring the results of past trials and sometimes seek other choice options to deal
with a sudden change in the reward contingency. Accordingly, animals often exhibit a
mixed strategy of choice repetition and occasional alternation, which is reminiscent of
the competing trends for repetition and repetition avoidance. However, this behavior
may be an artifact of reinforcement schedules which include contingency reversal that
are characteristic in animal studies. Recent studies using reinforcement learning models
for probabilistic learning (Sutton and Barto 1998; Samejima et al. 2005) may also have
the same problem. Therefore, a detailed investigation of an animal’s choice behavior
under a task structure without contingency reversal was needed to investigate the conﬂict
between repetition and repetition avoidance that has been suggested in human studies.
In the present study, there was no task-structural constraint for the monkeys to
alternate choices because the same amount of reward was always delivered regardless
of the saccade direction chosen in the FCT. With this experimental setup, we could
avoid the undesirable bias for response alternation present in the probabilistic learning
paradigm, and examine the animal’s innate tendency for repetition and repetition
avoidance. As shown in Results, both monkeys exhibited opposing history eﬀect which
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promoted and restrained response repetition. This ﬁnding suggests that the competition
between repetition and repetition avoidance is a common behavioral principle in humans
and non-human animals which organizes the animal’s choice behavior. Our work links
human and animal studies regarding the choice between equally valuable options, and
provides insights for future investigations of the nature of internally driven free choice
behavior.
Generalization to Other Decision-Making Tasks
In the present study, the monkey could obtain a reward every trial regardless of the task
or response direction. Application of reinforcement learning models to the monkey’s
behavior revealed that making a response decreased the value function of the response
direction (Table 1). However, in standard reinforcement learning models, the value of
a given action increases if the animal receives a reward after that response (Sutton and
Barto 1998; Samejima et al. 2005). In fact, the increment of the value function after
a reward is one of the most fundamental features of the reinforcement learning model,
which enables the animal to learn an appropriate behavioral strategy. In this regard,
the result reported in the present study may appear to be strange because it claims a
decrease in the value function every time the monkey made an action to a direction and
got rewarded. This discrepancy could be attributed to the task design used in the present
study. In contrast to the decision situation in probabilistic learning, the animals in the
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present study were able to receive a reward every trial, and didn’t need to search for an
advantageous behavioral strategy. Thus, the animals’ behavior in the present study was
not determined in terms of reward maximization. Therefore, the reinforcement learning
models and estimated value updates in the present study cannot be directly compared to
the other existing models for probabilistic learning.
The diﬀerence in task structures between the present and previous experiments could
raise a limitation in generalizing the present results. The decision-making tasks used in
cognitive science are composed of various complex features such as reward expectations
and risks in value-based decision-making (Platt and Glimcher 1999; Barraclough et al.
2004; Sugrue et al. 2004; Dorris and Glimcher 2004), discrimination about physical
properties of the stimuli in perceptual judgement (Newsome et al. 1989; Shadlen
and Newsome 1996; DeAngelis et al. 1998; de Lafuente and Romo 2005) and the
relationship and interaction between actors in social decision-making (Yoshida et al.
2011; Chang et al. 2013). It is not clear whether the animal’s tendency to avoid and
prefer repetitive behaviors observed under a free choice condition with none of these
features similarly operates in other decision situations. However, because the free
choice paradigm we used did not depend on any of these speciﬁc task components,
the present results could represent an innate behavioral tendency of animals that may
take place in any decision-making situations. According to the task constraints which
strongly determine the optimal behavioral strategy in probabilistic learning and other
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types of tasks, whether the animal’s natural tendency can be actually observed or
not depends on each experimental paradigm. Nevertheless, the knowledge about
the animal’s fundamental traits may help to understand the behavioral patterns under
various task constraints which take place over the pre-existing natural tendency, and
possibly resolves the inconsistency in observed behavior among diﬀerent studies and
tasks. Further studies are needed to investigate how the animal’s own tendency in
behavioral repetition is taken over by the requirements of the tasks.
Context Speciﬁcity of the Decision History Eﬀect
In the logistic regression analysis, we diﬀerentiated the preceding FCT trials with the
same (FCTs) and diﬀerent (FCTd) cue pair compared to the current trial, and examined
their eﬀects separately. Although these two conditions were identical in respect to “the
eﬀect of the past freely-chosen response toward one of the two directions available in
the current trial”, they had quite diﬀerent eﬀects on the monkey’s behavior (Fig. 3). The
choice in preceding FCTd trials exhibited a similar eﬀect to the preceding ICT trials,
and strongly prevented a repeated response to the same direction in consecutive trials.
In contrast, the choice in preceding FCTs trials showed consistently greater coeﬃcients
than those of FCTd and ICT trials, and mostly facilitated the repetitive response to the
same direction throughout the 10 trials of the preceding trial period, except for the −1
trial for monkey O. Even in this exceptional case, the coeﬃcients for the FCTs condition
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was neutral (about zero) and much greater than the coeﬃcients for the ICT and FCTd
conditions. In other words, according to the eﬀect of preceding ICT and FCTd trials,
monkey O had a robust tendency to avoid repeating the same response, but this tendency
was counteracted for preceding FCT trials with a cue pair identical to the current trial.
This result clearly indicates that making a decision promotes the same decision in
subsequent trials, but this eﬀect is highly context-dependent and only manifests in trials
with identical choice options. By cancelling out the eﬀect of preceding actions from
the eﬀect of preceding decisions (Fig. 4), a consistent result was observed. While the
decision history in preceding FCTs trials positively inﬂuenced the choice in the current
trial, the decision history in preceding FCTd trials exhibited only a small eﬀect that did
not exceed the chance level taken by a shuﬄing method.
These results suggest the importance of the decisional situation in sequential
behavior and the history eﬀect it exerts. Not only which action was chosen by the
animal, but also among which of the alternatives it was chosen may be a key to
the history eﬀect it exerts on subsequent trials. However, the eﬀect of choosing in
preceding trials was examined independently from the eﬀect of not choosing only in
FCTd trials. The dissociation of the eﬀects of choosing and not choosing was possible
because the cues presented in preceding FCTd trial were diﬀerent from those in the
current trial. In FCTs trials, two cues available in the preceding and current trials were
identical and therefore not choosing a direction necessarily means the choice of the
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other direction. Because of this coupling, we could not dissociate the eﬀect of choosing
and not choosing in preceding FCTs trials. Therefore, it is not clear whether the eﬀect
of the preceding FCTs trials was derived from a unique eﬀect of choosing in the same
decisional context, or can be fully explained in terms of the negative history eﬀect of
not choosing that might have taken place in these trials. Because the strong coupling of
choosing and not choosing in the same set of alternatives will cause a multicollinearity
of the explanatory variables, the dissociation of these features is diﬃcult. Future studies
using experimental tasks with three or more action alternatives in a trial to suﬃciently
control the risk of multicollinearity will reveal the respective eﬀects of choosing and
not choosing under the same and diﬀerent decisional context in animal’s free choice
behavior.
Dependence on the Eﬀector
In the present study, we used memory-guided saccade tasks in which the animals
had to express their decision by saccadic eye movement. However, with respect to
information-seeking, making a saccade may not be a mere designation of a location
but rather a completion of scanning that visual ﬁeld. Therefore, it is possible that the
monkeys’ choice behavior in the present study was aﬀected by their innate behavior
in visual foraging, and thus limited to the saccadic motor domain. Since the monkeys
could freely see everywhere during the inter-trial interval, it is not likely that the urge to
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watch a certain location of the display made a large contribution to the choice behavior
in the present study. Still, it is not clear our results regarding decision and action history
eﬀects can be generalized to other eﬀectors.
Previously, Lee and Schieber (2006) reported a monkey’s tendency to switch its
response direction in a hand-reaching task. When monkeys were allowed to choose
from left and right targets by themselves, they frequently changed their response from
the previous trial. This switching bias may seem to contradict the positive history eﬀect
of preceding decision observed in the present study. However, they also reported that
the monkeys showed a robust tendency to change the hand used in target-reaching in
consecutive trials, as well as a strong preference to choose a target that was ipsilateral
to the hand in use. Based on this ﬁnding, Lee and Schieber (2006) suggested that part
of the monkeys’ tendency to change the target choice could have been driven by the
bias to switch the hand in use. Also, the eﬀects of preceding decision and action were
not explicitly separated in their analysis. Therefore, further studies will be needed to
determine whether the diﬀerence between our result and those in the previous study
was caused by a diﬀerence in the eﬀector or some other experimental factors.
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(a) Schematic illustration of the two tasks. In the ICT, the monkey was required to
make a memory-guided saccade toward the cued location. In the FCT, the monkey also
needed to choose one of two cued locations before making a saccade. (b) Example of
variables in the logistic regression analysis. The values of i j (ICT), s j (FCTs), dj (FCTd
chosen) and uj (FCTd unchosen) in relation to direction A (right) and B (upper) that
are available in the current trial are shown in a matrix. Circles and arrows indicate the
location of the cue(s) and the monkey’s response in each trial, respectively.
Fig. 2
(a) Example of saccadic responses in a session for monkey E. Saccade trajectories for
all of the correct trials in a session are plotted in diﬀerent colors and symbols (ICT:
light crosses, FCT: dark circles). Eight black circles indicate the location and the
size of the visual cues. Axes are scaled in visual angles. (b) Choice proportion for
each pair condition in the FCT. For each box, the location of the median line (overall
session average) and the small dots (each session) indicate the proportion of choosing
the direction labeled at the top from the bottom (98 sessions each for both monkeys O
and E).
Fig. 3
(a, c) The coeﬃcients of logistic regression calculated from the real data. For both
monkeys, the preceding ICT trials (light gray) had negative regression coeﬃcients
especially just before the current trial. The coeﬃcients for preceding FCTd trials was
slightly positive for the chosen direction (solid dark gray) and negative for the unchosen
direction (dotted dark gray) compared to that of the ICT, but they were generally
parallel among these three conditions. On the other hand, the coeﬃcients for preceding
FCTs trials (black) was highly elevated from those in the other conditions, and the
diﬀerence drastically increased as a function of the number of preceding trials. Error
bars indicate the standard error based on the six pair conditions. Filled symbols indicate
the statistical signiﬁcance based on the shuﬄed samples (upright and inverted triangles
show a signiﬁcant increase and decrease, respectively). (b, d) The conﬁdence intervals
for the coeﬃcients based on the shuﬄed data (95% conﬁdence intervals with correction
for multiple comparisons).
Fig. 4
(a) The history eﬀect of preceding decision and action calculated from the coeﬃcients
of a logistic regression analysis. Data for monkey O (solid) and monkey E (dotted)
are plotted together. The history eﬀect of preceding action is a direct reproduction
of the regression coeﬃcients for the ICT in Fig. 3. Making a response to a direction
decreased the probability of choosing that direction in subsequent trials (light gray).
On the other hand, choosing a direction increased the probability of the same choice
in subsequent trials when the same cue pair was presented (black), but this eﬀect of
past decision did not take place when the cue pair was diﬀerent (dark gray). Error bars
indicate the standard error based on the six pair conditions. Filled symbols indicate
the statistical signiﬁcance based on the shuﬄed samples (upright and inverted triangles
show a signiﬁcant increase and decrease, respectively). (b) The conﬁdence intervals
for the history eﬀect of preceding decision and action based on the shuﬄed data (95%
conﬁdence intervals with correction for multiple comparisons).
Tables
Table 1 Average parameter estimates in the reinforcement learning models.
α ΔR ΔC ΔU AIC Prediction (%)
Monkey O (98)
R (2) 0.96 ± 0.17 −0.16 ± 0.35 — — 1.34 ± 0.05 52.8 ± 4.5
R+C (12) 0.98 ± 0.08 −0.08 ± 0.28 0.13 ± 0.30 — 1.26 ± 0.11 63.0 ± 6.9
R+C+U (84) 0.90 ± 0.22 −0.16 ± 0.35 0.06 ± 0.28 −0.21 ± 0.29 1.23 ± 0.11 62.6 ± 4.2
Monkey E (98)
R (3) 0.98 ± 0.06 −0.09 ± 0.27 — — 1.35 ± 0.06 52.0 ± 6.6
R+C (15) 0.98 ± 0.03 −0.06 ± 0.18 0.16 ± 0.23 — 1.26 ± 0.11 64.0 ± 7.7
R+C+U (80) 0.92 ± 0.12 −0.13 ± 0.28 0.11 ± 0.25 −0.28 ± 0.27 1.23 ± 0.11 66.2 ± 5.7
AIC was standardized by dividing the AIC in each session by the number of FCT trials
in the same session that were used in the maximum-likelihood estimation. Data are
mean ± standard deviation. Values in parentheses next to the names of the animals and
the models are the number of total sessions for each animal and the number of sessions
in which the model was selected to be optimal based on the AIC, respectively. The
models with ΔC parameter (R+C model and R+C+U model) were frequently selected
than the model without ΔC parameter. In both of the R+C and R+C+U models, ΔR was
signiﬁcantly smaller than zero and ΔC was signiﬁcantly larger than zero.
Fig. 1
(a) Behavioral tasks
Instructed Choice Task (ICT)
Fixation (1.0 s) Pre-Cue (1.0 s)
Cue (0.5 s)
Delay (1.5-3.0 s) Response (< 0.5 s)
Free Choice Task (FCT)
(b) Example of variables in the logistic regression analysis
 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 j
 0 0 0 0 0 1 i j
 0 0 -1 0 0 0 s j
 0 0 0 0 1 0 d j
 1 -1 0 0 0 0 u j
A
B
previous trials current trial
Fig. 2
(a) Example of saccade
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